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Summary: The supervisory board is a body of authority in the company treated as the basic in-
ternal mechanism of corporate governance. The aim of this article is to indicate the importance 
of the corporate supervision using the example of the supervisory board as a statutory body ex-
ercising permanent supervision over the activities of a limited liability company. The study at-
tempts to determine what powers of the aforementioned body should be extended in the arti-
cles of association and, optionally, in other corporate documents. This article has been written 
from a perspective of a legal-dogmatic approach that forms the basis of the analysis of the pre-
sented problems, using applicable legal provisions and relevant literature. The conducted ana- 
lysis shows that the power of the supervisory board cannot be increased in a way that infringes 
the functions of other company bodies. The supervisory board is expected to be involved in the 
day-to-day operations of the limited liability company and to make strategic decisions. 
Keywords: supervisory board, corporate governance, limited liability company, company 
deed, rights, competence 
Rada nadzorcza jako instrument wewnętrznego ładu korporacyjnego 
w spółce z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością
Streszczenie: Rada nadzorcza to organ władzy w spółce traktowany jako podstawowy we-
wnętrzny mechanizm nadzoru korporacyjnego. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie istoty nad-
zoru korporacyjnego na przykładzie rady nadzorczej jako organu ustawowo sprawującego stały 
nadzór nad działalnością spółki z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością. Przeprowadzone badania 
miały za zadanie ustalenie, jakie uprawnienia tego organu należy rozszerzyć w umowie spółki 
oraz fakultatywnie w innych dokumentach korporacyjnych. W niniejszym artykule wykorzy-
stano metodę dogmatycznoprawną, która była podstawą do przeprowadzenia analizy przedsta-
wionych problemów w oparciu o przepisy prawne oraz literaturę przedmiotu. 
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Z przeprowadzonej analizy wynika, że nie można zwiększyć uprawnień rady nadzorczej 
w sposób, który narusza funkcje innych organów spółki. Od rady nadzorczej oczekuje się za-
angażowania w bieżącą działalność spółki z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością oraz podejmowa-
nia strategicznych decyzji.
Słowa kluczowe: rada nadzorcza, nadzór korporacyjny, spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzial-
nością, umowa spółki, uprawnienia, kompetencje
JEL: K22, L22, M14
The supervisory board has a very important role to play in any limited liability com-
pany. Its duties include e.g. providing the shareholders with comfort in terms of the 
quality of management of the company in which they invested their money.
In order to take a more in-depth approach to the issues of the binding formal and legal 
framework that regulates the way corporate governance operates, one should still refer to no 
clear definition of the concept of corporate governance. Due to numerous interpretations of 
representatives of science and practitioners in this field, the term (in Polish lg. /transl.note/) is 
used interchangeably with owner governance , corporate order or the English phrase corporate 
governance. The supervisory board as a separate authority figures in companies with a two-tier 
board organization model. The second component of this model is the Management Board 
(Koładkiewicz, 2011, p. 111). The Polish corporate governance system is based to a significant 
extent on the dualistic (German) model (Żak, 2019, p. 22). The model was introduced by the 
Commercial Code, effective from July 1st, 1934, and involves the separation of supervisory 
functions – performed by the supervisory board, and management functions – performed by 
the management board. In 2001, there were changes in commercial law; the Commercial Code 
was repealed and replaced (Jeżak, Bohdanowicz, Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak, Matyjas, 2016, p. 108) 
by the Commercial Companies Code (The Act of 15 September 2000, OJ 2020. Pos. 1526, 
with later amendments).
The establishment of a corporate governance body in a capital company, which is the 
supervisory board or an audit committee, results from either the mandatory legal provi-
sions or the optional partners’ will expressed in the agreement, which in a limited liability 
company may also provide for the establishment of both bodies (Kulesza, 2002, p. 146). The 
advisability of establishing one or both supervisory authorities depends on the actual needs of 
the company and its capital structure. Pursuant to the provisions of Art. 212 CCC of the Act, 
the shareholders have the individual right to control the company. Moreover, the operating 
costs of supervisory authorities such as remuneration, per diems, etc., become significant. As 
a result, the appointment of a supervisory board or committee is advisable only in case of 
a justified fear that the individual right of control will not allow shareholders, e.g. due to lack 
of experience, to properly assess the functioning of the company. In view of the above, it is 
necessary to consider whether there is a need to establish a supervisory board that exercises its 
audit powers on a permanent basis, or whether it is enough to appoint an audit committee to 
carry out audits in a definite scope once a year. On the other hand, the establishment of two 
control bodies is recommended only in companies whose business range and extend justifies 
the need to be verified by two independent entities (Pabis, 2003, p. 251).
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The company’s agreement may establish either a supervisory board or an audit committee, 
or both (Art. 213 § 1 CCC). This provision applies to supervisory authorities of optional nature. 
If the articles of a limited liability company agreement provide for the appointment of only 
a supervisory board or only an audit committee, then the amendment to the limited liability 
company is required only in case of appointing the second supervision body. Appointment 
of mandatory supervisory bodies takes place when the two conditions listed in Art. 213 § 2 
CCC are simultaneously applicable. The share capital must exceed PLN 500,000 and there are 
more than twenty-five partners (Strzępka, Zielińska, 2015, pp. 546-547). If, due to statutory 
requirements or a provision in the articles of partnership agreement, the obligation to appoint 
a supervisory board or an audit commission results from the establishment of the company and 
the members of this body were not appointed until the company was registered, pursuant to 
Art. 165 of the CCC, the registration court will set a company in organization an appropriate 
deadline to rectify the deficiency on pain of refusing to enter the register. On the other hand, 
if the company was registered without appointing members of the supervisory board or audit 
committee, pursuant to Art. 172 § 1 of the Commercial Companies Code, the registry court, 
either ex officio or at the request of persons with legal interest, summons the company to 
rectify the deficiencies with an appropriate deadline being set up. But then again, there are 
no coercive proceedings in a situation where the obligation to establish a supervisory board or 
an audit commission arises during the course of the company and the members of the bodies 
are not appointed. In such a situation, a shareholder or partners representing at least 1/10 of 
the company’s share capital and who are interested in the appointment of members of the 
supervisory body shall be entitled – pursuant to Art. 236 § 1 of the Commercial Companies 
Code – to request to convene an extraordinary meeting of shareholders, as well as to include 
on the agenda of the next meeting of shareholders a resolution to appoint members of the 
supervisory body. If such a meeting has not been convened by the management board, an 
authorized partner or partners may apply to the registry court for authorization to convene the 
meeting (Chomiuk, 2014, p. 853). Furthermore, who – being a member of the management 
board or liquidator – allows the company to remain without the supervisory board in proper 
arrangement for more than three months, which constitutes breaching the law or contract 
provisions – is subject to a fine of up to PLN 20,000 (The Act of 15 September 2000, OJ 2020. 
Pos. 1526, with later amendments).
The author of this dissertation will defend its main hypothesis that the supervisory board 
plays a huge role in exercising corporate supervision in a limited liability company. The opera-
tion of the supervisory board expected in the everyday practice of Polish companies is based on 
the supervision exercised in an effective and competent manner. Members of the supervisory 
board should act in the interest of the company, be independent in their actions, and support 
the management board in making key decisions. Unfortunately, such a supervision model is 
relatively rare.
The literature on the subject partially attributes the passive approach of the supervisory 
board to the provisions of the Commercial Companies Code that are limited only to the con-
trolling and supervisory powers of the supervisory board. However, the CCC allows for the 
extension of the said powers in the articles of association or other corporate documents. 
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The concept of supervision and control 
The supervisory board is an entity with supervisory powers. M. Bogacz-Miętka points 
out that the concept of supervision and control should be distinguished. These terms are not 
identical. The encyclopaedia of law defines supervision as a type of activity involving con-
trol and competence to substantively correct the activities of an entity subject to supervision 
(Bogacz-Miętka, 2011, pp. 16-17). The concept of supervision includes both control, and thus 
auditing, checking the company’s operations as a supervised entity for compliance with the law, 
contractual provisions and other internal acts in force in the company, as well as the possibility 
of issuing instructions (Kopaczyńska-Pieczniak, 2013, p. 600), subject to the provisions of Art. 
219 § 2 of the Commercial Companies Code – pursuant to which these instructions cannot 
be binding on the management board as far as running the company’s affairs are concerned. 
For that reason, there is a separation of executive and supervisory functions. As M. Wyrwiński 
indicates, the concepts of supervision and control do not mean the same. The concept of control 
is perceived as the possibility of obtaining information on the activities of the controlled entity 
or body, whereas supervision defines the rights that, in addition to obtaining information, 
allow for supreme influence over the activities of the supervised entity or body (Wyrwiński, 
2004, p.183). K. Kopaczyńska-Pieczniak points out significant differences between supervision 
and control. First of all, supervision differs from control in the scope of actions that can be 
taken, because control is the right to inspect the activities of a given entity and to request 
information and explanations, while supervision also includes the right to take actions binding 
the supervised entity. Therefore, the concept of supervision is broader than control and it is of 
permanent nature (Kopaczyńska-Pieczniak, 2013, pp. 626-627).
Model of individual and collegial supervision 
The statutory supervisory powers have been defined in Art. 219 § 1 and § 3-4 CCC, accord-
ing to which the board supervision is permanent and concerns the functioning of the entire 
company, i.e. it is not limited to financial matters only, but applies to all areas of the company’s 
activities. The specific duties of the supervisory board are indicated in Art. 219 § 3 CCC, which 
is of semi-imperative nature. The specific duties of the supervisory board include the assessment 
of the reports referred to in Art. 231 § 2 point 1 of the Commercial Companies Code, i.e. the 
management board’s report on the company’s operations and the financial statements for the 
previous financial year in terms of their compliance with the accounting books, documents, 
and the actual state, as well as the management board’s conclusions regarding either distribu-
tion of profit or coverage of loss and submission of an annual written report on the results 
of this assessment during shareholders’ meeting. Art. 219 § 4 of the CCC sets out the basic 
powers for the supervisory board for the proper exercise of the supervisory function (Strzępka, 
Zielińska, 2003, pp. 626-627).
The supervisory board has the right to review all company documents: financial, human 
resources, contracts, the management board resolutions (Kidyba, 2017, p. 1065). The right to 
view books and documents applies to all documents and collections prepared both in paper 
and electronic form (Pinior, 2013, p. 429). Members of the management board and employees 
are required to provide members of the supervisory board with access to accounting books 
and documents, provide access to all premises, both in the headquarters and branches, and 
make archives, cash registers and safes available. The review of the indicated documents should 
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take place at the registered office of the company or its branch (Kidyba, 2017, p. 1066). The 
supervisory board may also demand access to documents kept outside the company›s registered 
office, e.g. held by an entity providing accounting services. In addition, the supervisory board 
has the right to demand reports and explanations from members of the management board 
and employees of the company, as well as to audit the assets. These documents will usually 
cover specific areas of the company›s operations and will contain information on contracts 
being concluded, financial standing – including the number of loans and borrowings taken – 
projected development of the company›s enterprise, employment status, level of remuneration, 
etc. (Pinior, 2013, p. 429).
The model of individual supervision by members of the supervisory board of 
a limited liability company is relative. Pursuant to the articles of partnership agreement, it may 
be replaced by the principle of collegial action of board members, i.e. the model in force in a 
public limited liability company (Szumański, 2015, p. 547). Adopting a model of individual 
supervisory activities in a limited liability company gives individual members of the supervi-
sory board a strong position, as each member of the supervisory board may exercise supervision 
without the need to obtain separate authorization from the supervisory board.
In fear of abusing the exercise of individual rights by members of the supervisory board, or 
misusing information obtained by them in this particular way, the shareholders may change 
the statutory model of exercising control activities in the company in the articles. The articles of 
agreement of a limited liability company may change the principle of exercising supervision by 
adopting a collegial model of a public limited liability company. The articles of agreement may 
indicate that the supervisory board performs its duties collectively, while individual supervisory 
activities will be performed by individual members pursuant to the authorization expressed in 
the resolution of the supervisory board. These activities should only be performed in person 
by members of the supervisory board. It is not possible to authorize third parties to perform 
supervisory activities on behalf of a member of the board due to the risk of disclosure of 
information and trade secrets of the company (Pinior, 2013, pp. 432-433).
In accordance with Art. 219 § 3 of the CCC, the supervisory board is obliged to submit 
a written report on its activities to the shareholders› meeting each year. The wording of this 
article indicates that the written report must cover the compliance of the management board›s 
report on the company›s activities and the financial statements for the financial year with the 
company›s books and documents and with the actual state and assessment of the management 
board›s conclusions regarding distribution of profit or coverage of loss. Regarding the latter 
issue, the assessment of the supervisory board should take into account not only the compat-
ibility of the proposed distribution of profit or potential loss with the articles of partnership 
agreement and with accounting books and documents, but also the advisability from the point 
of view of the company›s situation (Litwińska-Werner, 2007, pp. 607-608).
The supervisory board report on the results of the assessment of the reports and conclu-
sions referred to in Art. 219 § 3 of the CCC, should be distinguished from any report by 
the supervisory board not regulated by the Code of Commercial Companies concerning its 
activities in the financial year. The report on the activities of the supervisory board submitted 
to the ordinary meeting of shareholders describes the course of ongoing supervision by the 
supervisory board over the company›s operations and the use by the supervisory board of other 
supervisory or other instruments, e.g. in the representation of the company in contracts and 
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disputes with board members, if any were granted in the articles of partnership agreement or 
result from legal provisions (Nowacki, 2018, pp. 1386-1387).
In addition to the obligations and rights contained in Art. 219 of the Code of Commercial 
Companies, there are other powers of the supervisory board applicable from the Act. These are 
as follows:
•	 representing the company in contracts between the company and a member  
of the management board and in a dispute with him (Art. 210 of the CCC);       
•	 giving consent to members of the management board to deal with competitive interests, 
provided that the articles of agreement state so, or if the supervisory board is entitled  
to appoint a management board (Art. 211 of the CCC);   
•	 convening an ordinary meeting of shareholders, if the management board fails to convene 
it within the time limit specified in the provisions of the Commercial Companies Code  
or the articles of agreement; an extraordinary meeting of shareholders, if it deems necessary 
to convene it and the management board does not convene it within 2 weeks of the request 
being made by the supervisory board (Art. 235 CCC);
•	 bringing an action to repeal the resolution of the shareholders (Art. 250 point 1 of the 
Commercial Companies Code) and for annulment of the resolution of the partners  
(Art. 252 § 1 in connection with the Art. 250 (1) of the Commercial Companies Code)  
– the power is vested collectively by the entire body and each member individually;
•	 selecting the entity authorized to audit financial statements to perform an audit or review 
of the financial statements, as long as that the company’s financial statements are subject 
to the auditor’s audit and the company’s articles provide for appropriate authority for the 
supervisory board (Chomiuk, 2014, pp. 872-873).
Particularly noteworthy is the statutory right of the supervisory board to represent the 
company in contracts between the company and members of the management board and in 
dispute between the company and the management board or members of the management 
board.  Art. 210 § 1 of the Commercial Companies Code delegates performing representa-
tive activities on behalf of the company to the supervisory board or a proxy appointed by 
resolution of the meeting of shareholders. (Kidyba, 2009, p. 559). The issue of the company’s 
representation by the supervisory board in contracts with a member of its management board 
raises many significant doubts, which include, among others, powers of the supervisory board 
in the situation of appointing a proxy in the company, determining the manner of representing 
the company by the supervisory board or determining the legal effects of a contract concluded 
in breach of Art. 210 § 1 of the CCC. From the point of view of a member of the manage-
ment board, it is important that the contract concluded with the company is valid, and thus 
concluded in a manner resulting from the mandatory provision of Art. 210 § 1 of the CCC, 
and truly satisfy the company’s internal regulations, which may derive from the provisions of 
the articles of agreement and the Rules of the Supervisory Board (Oczkowski, 2014, p. 912). 
The competence of the supervisory board to represent the company covers all types of contracts 
concluded with management board members; those that constitute the source for perform-
ing their functions, e.g. a company management contract, as well as contracts not related to 
performing the functions of a management board member, e.g. a sale, rental or lease agreement 
(Kopaczyńska-Pieczniak, 2013, p. 638). In its judgment of August 18th, 2005, the Supreme 
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Court indicated that Art. 203 CCC and Art. 210 § 1 of the Code of Commercial Companies 
and Partnerships do not differentiate legal transactions and apply to all contracts between the 
company and a member of the management board, regardless of whether these contracts are 
related to their function on the company›s management board (Oczkowski, 2014, p. 906).
Suggestions de lege ferenda
Article 220 of the CCC indicates the possibilities of extending the powers of the supervisory 
board to other than those specified in Art. 219 CCC. The powers of the supervisory board can 
be extended only in the articles of agreement. Increasing the powers of the supervisory board 
cannot be implemented in a way that violates the functions of other company bodies, especially 
those resulting from mandatory provisions of the law (Litwińska, 1999, p. 234). The following 
are statutorily provided possibilities of extending the powers of this body: making the manage-
ment board’s activities specified in the articles of agreement subject to the permission of the 
supervisory board and the transfer to the supervisory board the right to suspend individual 
or all members of the board for important reasons (The Act of 15 September 2000, OJ 2020. 
Pos. 1526, with later amendments). The wording included in Art. 220 CCC indicates that it 
is possible to grant the supervisory board other powers than expressing consent for certain 
activities by the management board and suspension of individual or all members of this body 
(Litwińska-Werner, 2007, p. 608).
The articles of partnership agreement should strictly define the activities for which the 
management board of the company will be required to obtain the consent of the supervisory 
board. Examples of the powers of the supervisory board include: passing on the management 
board by-laws, approval of the company’s long-term development plans and annual financial 
plans and changes in those plans or granting the consent to the payment of interim dividend.
The catalogue of activities may also be specified in an amount, e.g. activities resulting in 
a liability for the company in the amount exceeding the indicated amount per year (Chomiuk, 
2014, p. 875).The following examples of competence of the supervisory board can be added: 
employment contracts and civil contracts of personnel with an annual value exceeding a certain 
amount, regardless of the number of contracts conducted, regulation and incurring liabilities 
exceeding a certain amount under certain conditions.
A distinction should be made between the management board›s consent to a specific ac-
tion and the issuing of binding instructions regarding the conduct of the company›s affairs 
(Art. 219 § 2 of the CCC). A similar regulation exists in a public limited liability company 
(Art. 3751 CCC).
If the articles of agreement contain a clause extending the powers of the supervisory 
board in such a way that the management board will have to obtain the board’s consent to 
carry out certain activities in the external sphere, then Art. 17 § 3 CCC applies. It refers to 
the effects of performing actions without the consent of the supervisory board. A legal act car-
ried out without the consent of the board will be valid and the management board will be liable 
to the company for activities contrary to the contract. The premise for the management board’s 
liability will be the damage caused to the company in a causal relationship with the fault of the 
management board member. Responsible for this will be specifically indicated members of the 
company’s management board (Litwińska-Werner, 2007, p. 608-609).
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The second special right to extend the powers of the supervisory board, independent of 
any power to appoint and dismiss members of the management board, may be the right to 
suspend individual or all members of the management board for important reasons. The 
decision to suspend a member of the management board is made by the supervisory board 
in corpore pursuant to a resolution adopted by an absolute majority, unless the articles of part-
nership agreement impose more stringent requirements in this respect. Important reasons will 
be defined differently depending on the type of business conducted by the company (Tomczak, 
2006, pp. 152-153). The Court of Appeal in its judgment of 20 December 2012 (reference 
number act I ACa 403/12) pointed out that the content of Art. 220 CCC gives the company the 
right to contractually extend the powers of the Supervisory Board, but only to the extent specified 
in the Act. Since the Act stipulates the extension of the board’s powers to suspend management 
board members with an indication that only valid reasons can be the basis for suspension, there is 
no justification for the view that the board’s competence also exists as to the possibility of suspending 
board members for any reason. Such an expanding understanding of Art. 220 CCC would be in 
clear contradiction with the content of Art. 219 § 1-4 of the CCC specifying the basic rights and 
obligations of the supervisory board of a limited liability company.
The Act of 16 December 2016 on the principles of managing state property (Act of 16 
December 2016 on the principles of state property management, OJ 2020, item 735 with later 
amendments) gave the supervisory board additional competence, which had to be implemented 
in accordance with Art. 17 (2) of the Act. The consent of a supervisory authority is required 
when it comes to concluding, among others, a contract for legal services, marketing services, 
services in the field of interpersonal relations (public relations) and social communication, as 
well as management consulting services, if the amount of remuneration in total for the services 
rendered exceeds PLN 500,000 net on an annual basis.
Good and effective corporate governance should stimulate company bodies to achieve as-
sumed goals and contribute to the implementation of the adopted strategy (Grabowska, 2015, 
p. 68). The supervisory board’s influence on the strategy and development direction of the 
company is increasing, but the responsibility and tasks delegated to this board are becom-
ing greater and greater, too. It is pointed out that supervisory boards should transform into 
a body that will not only follow the management board›s activities, but will also take over part 
of the responsibility for business decisions (Pałasz, 2017, p. B10). According to A. Peszko, it 
can be assumed that the supervisory board has primary responsibility for the entire corporate 
management process in the strategic area. This approach does not mean, however, that the 
management board is released from the obligation to actively shape the development directions 
of the corporation. Therefore, the optimal solution is mutual complementary activity of the 
supervisory board and the management board in shaping the concept of strategic development 
of the corporation (Peszko, 2006, p. 84-85).
It is necessary to create opportunities to exchange knowledge and experience between the 
management board and the supervisory board. For this reason, one of the key elements is to 
create the partnership relations between the board and the management board, which are 
bodies of the same company and represent a common economic interest. An example of such 
cooperation is the participation of members of the management board or the key management 
in meetings held by the supervisory board, increasing the amount of time spent together to 
discuss matters relating to the company, e.g. discussing key projects, ongoing discussion about 
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business prospects and the risks associated with them. The purpose of this relationship is to cre-
ate opportunities for joint decision making, regardless of how those decisions will subsequently 
be implemented. For this reason, it is postulated to keep the supervisory board informed about 
significant events in the company, the most important plans, organization of joint meetings 
so as to create the opportunity to benefit from the supervisory board’s observations, enable 
the board itself to provide real business support and ultimately to take joint responsibility for 
decisions made. The supervisory board understood as an advisor and a body jointly responsible 
for business decisions may contribute to the improvement of the company›s operations, elimi-
nation of risks related to its operations, increase the company›s value and its competitiveness 
(Kwaśnicki, Nalazek, 2018, p. 16).
The competences of supervisory board members have a crucial impact on the quality of 
supervision. The key is the selection of candidates with appropriate qualifications and the 
professionalization of supervisory boards. P. Kozarzewski states that work in the supervisory 
board requires professional credentials in the field of microeconomics, corporate finances, law, 
and knowledge of market economy rules (Kozarzewski, 2000, p. 346).
A member of the supervisory board should have not only knowledge and experience, but 
also a number of personal characteristics. Of great importance in fulfilling their supervisory 
functions are: (i) the ability to express their own opinion, especially when it is completely 
different from the opinions of other board members, (ii) a strong will, (iii) the ability to look 
at various problems from a distance and (iv) the ability to look forward (Jeżak, 2005, p. 66).
In the light of the above, it should be considered that the qualifications of the members 
of the supervisory board should be closely linked to the company›s strategy. The supervisory 
board should be characterised by diversity in education and experience of its members in 
terms of expertise, technical and business experience as well as experience in the international 
environment.
The basic competence of the supervisory board is to exercise constant supervision over the 
company›s activities in all areas of its activity. However, as the results of the study published 
in the report Supervisory boards in Poland: functions, responsibilities, priorities (Deloitte Report, 
2019, p. 6) indicate, it is generally believed that even the best board of directors composed of 
prominent and experienced experts focuses primarily on the evaluation of documents created 
by the board and usually remains in the shade of the company’s activities. Drawing on their 
extensive professional experience, the surveyed representatives of supervisory boards indicated 
numerous good practices that can be used to increase the work efficiency and effectiveness 
of the supervisory board. The most frequently cited proposals are, among others: systematic 
training and competence development of supervisory board members in the field of basic du-
ties, regular meetings aimed at getting to know the company’s business from the practical side 
(e.g. meeting with the heads of operational departments, visiting the branches or production 
plants ), avoiding discussions without conclusions during the meetings of the supervisory board 
(Deloitte Report, 2019, p. 30).
An in-depth discussion on the competences of supervisory boards and their members is 
particularly important in the context of the reform of corporate governance provisions. On 
10 February 2020, the ordinance of the Minister of State Assets established the Commission for 
the Reform of Corporate Governance, the purpose of which is to develop proposals to reform 
legal regulations in the field of corporate governance, in particular to make recommendations 
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including the scope of introducing group law, competences of supervisory boards and their 
members, with strong emphasis on the rights and obligations as well as the role of supervisory 
boards of parent companies in the area of  supervision over capital group assets (Projekt Reformy 
Nadzoru Właścicielskiego – Ministerstwo Aktywów Państwowych – Portal Gov.pl {www.gov.pl}, 
access: 18 March 2021).
A properly composed supervisory board becomes at the same time a good and cheaper advi-
sor for company managers, as well as a guarantee of security for the owner. The core for good 
decision making is good communication between the management board and the supervisory 
board, or even their permanent dialogue, especially in the case of outsized companies and 
high-value transactions (Kwaśnicki, 2019, p. 14).
R.L. Kwaśnicki accepts that it should be considered that any natural person with full legal 
capacity may be appointed (delegated) to the supervisory board of a limited liability company 
(Art. 18 § 1 of the CCC). This rule, however, experiences certain exceptions that may arise 
from either the provisions of generally applicable law, including the Commercial Companies 
Code and specific provisions, or the article of partnership agreement (Kwaśnicki, 2005, p. 304).
As D. Wajda indicates, in the literature there is no detailed analysis of the legal nature of 
the relationship that connects the company with a member of the supervisory body. However, 
several important features can be indicated, including its content being a commitment to 
diligent and loyal performance of the function of a member of the supervisory body (Wajda, 
2009, p. 166).
In Art. 214 of the CCC, the legislator indicated a group of persons who cannot perform 
supervisory functions in a limited liability company. The ban was imposed on managers of 
company branches, lawyers, persons employed in the company who report directly to members 
of the management board or the liquidator, members of the management board, members of 
the supervisory board, the audit committee and the liquidators of the company or subsidiary 
cooperative (The Act of 15 September 2000, OJ 2020. Pos. 1526, with later amendments). The 
extension of the prohibition is also related to the fact that in relation to the chief accountant, le-
gal adviser and persons who are directly subordinate to the members of the management board 
or the liquidator, employment in the company – which may also occur on the basis of a legal 
relationship other than an employment relationship – was assumed as an exclusion condition 
(Strzelczyk, 2011, pp. 381-382). As emphasized by M. Król-Gajewska and A. Wyrzykowska, 
this ban applies to a given position at the time of being appointed to the supervisory board. 
Violation of the ban on joining positions makes the appointment to the supervisory board 
invalid (Art. 214 § 1 of the CCC in connection with Art. 58 § 1 of the CCC). As a rule, mem-
bers of the supervisory board are appointed by a resolution of partners. However, the articles 
of partnership agreement may regulate another way of appointing or removing a supervisory 
board (Król-Gajewska, Wyrzykowska, 2017, pp. 128-129).
The ban on joining positions cannot be limited in the articles of association or excluded 
because of its absolute nature. However, an extension of the catalogue of persons who cannot 
sit on the company’s supervisory body should be considered acceptable (Pinior, 2016, p. 327).
The Act on the principles of state property management introduced additional require-
ments for members of supervisory boards of capital companies with the participation of 
the State Treasury or the participation of state legal persons. In the case of a candidate for 
a member of the supervisory board, additional qualifications required are specified in Art. 19 
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of this Act. Appointment to the supervisory board of a person who does not have the appropri-
ate competence to supervise a given company may be assessed as contrary to decency, and 
also violating the company›s interest, while specific requirements are laid down in the statute 
(Bilewska, 2016, p. C8).
Members of the supervisory board in connection with the performance of their functions 
bear not only corporate responsibility manifesting in the possibility of their dismissal before the 
end of the term of office. They also bear civil liability for any damage caused to the company 
and criminal liability for the so-called crime of mismanagement or abuse of trust (Report No. 
12/2019 Deloitte Polska, p. 13.). The question of abuse of trust is indicated in Art. 296 of the 
Penal Code.
The members of the supervisory board are obliged to perform supervisory duties properly, 
resulting from the professional nature of this activity. In accordance with Art. 293 CCC, 
a member of the supervisory board is liable to the company for damage caused by an act or 
omission which is contrary to the law or the articles of agreement, unless he is not at fault. This 
provision constitutes the general basis for liability for compensation of a member of the super-
visory board in relation to his or her function (Rachwał 2012, p. 835). The damage referred to 
in this article means both a loss in the company›s assets and lost profits (Act of 23 April 1964 
- Civil Code, Journal 2020 r., Pos. 1740 with later amendments) and taking evidence of these 
circumstances burdens the company (Kwaśnicki, 2005, p. 317). The liability of the supervisory 
board member for damages is based on the principle of guilt. It is assumed that this is an al-
leged fault, similarly to Art. 417 of the Civil Code, as a designation of a case where the accused 
is liable to prove lack of guilt. The existence of fault cannot be equated with due diligence in the 
performance of the duties of a member of the body. The measure of diligence indicated in Art. 
293 § 2 and 483 § 2 of the Code of Commercial Companies is objectified and is a benchmark 
for the quality of supervision in a capital company (Siemiątkowski, 2007, p. 185).
The responsibility of the members of the supervisory board is also regulated in the provi-
sions of special acts, including the Act of 29 September 1994 on accounting (Journal of Laws 
of 2021, item 217, as amended). Violation of the provisions of the Act in question in terms of 
reporting and financial obligations may result in prosecution of obligated persons, including 
members of supervisory boards. A member of the supervisory board may also be held liable 
pursuant to the provisions of the Act above, in particular if they have not provided or provided 
incorrect information, explanations, and statements to the statutory auditor or prevented them 
from performing their duties. Such actions are punishable by a fine or imprisonment up to two 
years (Report No. 12/2019 Deloitte Polska, p. 13).
From liability arising from Art. 293 CCC a member of the supervisory board can be re-
leased only by obtaining discharge from their duties, unless facts and documents on the basis 
of which a board member obtained discharge are questioned (Rachwał, 2012, p. 836).  In the 
event of an action brought by a partner to repair damage caused to the company, as referred 
to in Art. 295 § 1 of the Commercial Companies Code, and also after the declaration of 
bankruptcy of the company has become legally binding, members of the supervisory board 
cannot refer to the discharge received or the waiver of damages claims made by the company 
(Kwaśnicki 2005, p. 319).
As indicated by interviews with respondents carried out during the survey entitled »Super-
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visory boards in Poland: functions, responsibilities, priorities«, supervisory boards devote most 
of their attention to aspects related to the results of the organization and monitoring of reports 
provided by the management board. Control activities, although not always indicated as the 
most important area of  activity in the opinion of the board members themselves, in practice 
constitute the basic reference point when analyzing the description of activities undertaken by 
the supervisory board (Kwaśnicki 2005, p. 22). The other important area of  the supervisory 
board›s activity is compliance, i.e. a state of compliance; a way of doing business in which 
the corporation complies within all applicable legal frames, supervisory regulations and other 
standards related to the corporation. The Supervisory Board monitors the risk of manage-
ment process and examines the areas particularly exposed to that risk. These are: strategy of 
organisation, operational activities, finances and compliance. Therefore, it seems that the most 
important area of  activity of the supervisory board is the strategy from which other activities 
and risk management arise.
Summary
The supervisory board of a limited liability company is a basic, internal mechanism for 
its corporate governance. In principle, it is an optional body in the case of a limited liability 
company. However, it is compulsory to appoint supervisory board members in such a company 
if the two conditions specified in article 213 of the second paragraph of the Commercial Com-
panies Code are fulfilled cumulatively. This Code also makes it possible to extend the powers 
of a supervisory board specified in article 219. Nonetheless, this cannot violate any rights or 
functions of the other corporate bodies. 
The competences of supervisory board members have a crucial impact on the quality of 
supervision, so they should be considered primary strategic competences. It is crucial that 
members of the supervisory board have knowledge and experience related to the subject of the 
company’s operations and that they actively participate in creating the company’s goodwill and 
processes of strategic importance for the results it achieves. Limiting the role of the supervisory 
board to exercising its powers related only to control and supervision deprives the company of 
the possibility to fully use the resources available in the form of unique knowledge, compe-
tences and experience contributed by individual members of the supervisory board. Granting 
the supervisory board with additional rights – specified expressis verbis in the limited liability 
company deed – affects the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
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